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Message Text

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41
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 /026 W
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O P 301815 Z MAR 73
FM USDEL SALT TWO II
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1903
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
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S E C R E T USDEL SALT TWO II 0127

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652 XGDSI
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: SALT: MARCH 30, 1973 MEETING

REF: USDEL SALT TWO II 128 & 129

1. SUMMARY. JOHNSON LED OFF MARCH 30 MEETING WITH STATEMENT ON THROW- WEIGHT. SEMENOV MADE STATEMENT ON RESTRAINT, PRINCIPLES AND AIR DEFENSES. JOHNSON STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF LIMITING ICBM LAUNCHER NUMBERS AND TOTAL ICBM THROW- WEIGHT. HE SAID IA DID NOT SOLVE PROBLEM OF LIMITING DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF ICBM FORCES AND CONCLUDED ICBM THROW- WEIGHT MUST BE LIMITED TO LEVEL WHICH, OVER TIME, WOULD PERMIT EQUALITY BETWEEN TWO SIDES. SEMENOV, IN CONTINGENCY STATEMENT, CONFIRMED INSTRUCTIONS TO REJECT THROW- WEIGHT PROPOSAL. HE THEN ADDRESSED " RESTRAINT," REPEATING PREVIOUS PROPOSALS THIS REGARD. HE SAID FBS MUST BE INCLUDED AMONG STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND ONE SIDE' S PLACING OF MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON EVER GREATER NUMBER ICBMS AND SLBMS DOES NOT FACILITATE FINDING WAYS TO LIMIT OFFENSIVE ARMS. HE CONCLUDED THAT AIR DEFENSES ARE NOT SUBJECT FOR TALKS ON OFFENSIVE ARMS. NEXT MEETING APRIL 3. END SUMMARY.

2. JOHNSON SAID LAUNCHER NUMBERS AND MISSILE THROW- WEIGHT
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CAPACITY ARE SIGNIFICANT VERIFIABLE ASPECTS DEPLOYED ICBM FORCES. THUS, EQUAL LIMITS ON ICBM LAUNCHERS AND THROW- WEIGHT

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ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF PERMANENT AGREEMENT REPLACING IA.
RECALLING SIDES ACKNOWLEDGED IT APPROPRIATE TO LIMIT ICBM LAUNCHER NUMBERS, JOHNSON BELIEVED BOTH UNDERSTAND UNIQUE ROLE ICBMS IN STRATEGIC BALANCE. EQUAL CEILINGS ON ICBM LAUNCHER NUMBERS ARE NCESSARY FOR ESTABLISHING EQUAL SECURITY AND ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE AND WOULD CONSTRAIN COMPONENT OF OFFENSIVE FORCES POSING GREATEST POTENTIAL THREAT TO OTHER SIDE' S DETERRENT.

3. JOHNSON SAID SOV DEL PROPOSALS TO DATE APPEAR ONE- SIDED ATTEMPTS TO CONSTRAIN CERTAIN US PROGRAMS WHILE IGNORING POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING USSR PROGRAMS SUCH AS NEW ICBMS AND HEAVY ICBMS. SUCH PROPOSALS WOULD UNDERMINE STABILITY WHICH CANNOT BE ENHANCED BY INDISCRIMINATELY LIMITING ONE SIDE' S ARMS WITHOUT REGARD FOR THEIR DETERRENT ABILITY OR FOR LIMITING FORCES THREATENING THIS ABILITY. US APPROACH IS TO LIMIT THREATS TO DETERRENT FORCES' SURVIVABILITY AND PENETRATION CAPABILITY, THUS REDUCING NEED FOR MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT.

4. JOHNSON DECLARED NUMERICAL LIMIT ON LAUNCHERS NOT IN ITSELF ADEQUATE TO MAINTAIN SURVIVABILITY. IN CONTEXT OF PERMANENT AGREEMENT, THROW- WEIGHT IS ONE OF MOST IMPORTANT MEASURES ICBM POTENTIAL CAPABILITY. CEILING ON AGGREGATE ICBM THROW- WEIGHT IMPORTANT AS CLEAR WAY TO LIMIT LONG- TERM ICBM FORCE POTENTIAL. BOTH SIDES SHOULD SHARE CONCERN FOR POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING EFFECT LARGE MISSILES. THEY ARE NOT NECESSARY TO DETERRENCE AND, IF SUBJECT TO TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS, COULD GRAVELY THREATEN SURVIVABILITY CERTAIN ELEMENTS RETALIATORY FORCES. EVEN IF POSSESSED BY ONE SIDE ONLY, CONCENTRATION LARGE PORTION THAT SIDE' S RETALIATORY CAPABILITY IN RELATIVELY FEW LAUNCHERS COULD, IN CRISIS, BE INCONSISTENT WITH DESIRE TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WAR RISK.

5. JOHNSON CONCLUDED THAT PERMANENT AGREEMENT SHOULD ACCOUNT FOR DIFFERENT DESIGN APPROACHES SIDES MAY TAKE AND LIMIT ADVERSE IMPACT POTENTIAL TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT MAY HAVE ON STRATEGIC STABILITY. IA DID NOT SOLVE PROBLEM LIMITING DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL ICBM FORCES IN WAY APPROPRIATE FOR PERMANENT AGREEMENT. THROW- WEIGHT LIMIT WOULD IMPOSE CLEAR CEILING ON THIS POTENTIAL AND TAKE ACCOUNT DIFFERENT APPROACHES
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TO BOOSTER DESIGN.

6. SEMENOV READ CONTINGENCY STATEMENT, CONCLUDING HE WAS INSTRUCTED REJECT THROW- WEIGHT PROPOSAL AS UNACCEPTABLE.

7. THEN, AFTER CITING BASIC PRINCIPLES, SEMENOV IMAGINED SITUATION WHERE ONE SIDE DEVELOPS NEW TYPES OFFENSIVE ARMS, OR UNDERTAKES MAJOR NEW OFFENSIVE ARMS PROGRAMS OR HEAVY

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DEPLOYMENT ARMS NOT LIMITED BY AGREEMENT. THIS WOULD UPSET STRATEGIC STABILITY AND LEAD TO NEW ROUND COMPETITION. ON OTHER HAND, RESTRAINT CORRESPONDS LETTER AND SPIRIT MOSCOW DOCUMENTS AND IA PROVIDES BASIS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE RESULTS. HE SUBMITTED PROPOSAL THAT SIDES ASSUME OBLIGATIONS TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN AREAS NOT LIMITED BY AGREEMENT AND REFRAIN FROM MAJOR NEW PROGRAMS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND BAN DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT NEW TYPES SUCH ARMS WHICH COULD INCREASE DANGER NUCLEAR WAR.

8. TURNING TO US STATEMENTS ON " SURVIVABILITY" AND " PENE-TRATION CAPABILITIES" SO- CALLED " DETERRENT FORCES," I. E. SO- CALLED " CENTRAL SYSTEMS," HE SAID ATTEMPTS TO PORTRAY THESE AS MAIN FACTOR IN ENSURING STABILITY ARE INCOMPLETE AND ARTIFICIAL. IT IS INCORRECT TO SUBSTITUTE WORKING OUT LIMITS ON " CENTRAL SYSTEMS" FOR TASK OF REACHING MORE COMPLETE AGREEMENT OFFENSIVE ARMS AS WHOLE, INCLUDING FBS AND CARRIER- BASED AIR.

9. SEMENOV SAID THAT, IF RESOLUTION OF TASKS HERE WERE BASED ON INSURING " GREATER CAPABILITY TO PENETRATE DEFENSES," ONE COULD CONCLUDE THAT ACCELERATED PLACEMENT OF MULTIPLE WARHEADS ON ICBMS AND SLBMS CONTRIBUTES TO STABILITY. GIVEN ABM TREATY, IF ONE SIDE PLACES MUTIPLE WARHEADS ON EVER INCREASING PORTION ITS ICBMS AND SLBMS, THIS CLEARLY NOT AIMED AT INSURING " GREATER PENETRATION CAPABILITIES" BUT AT INCREAS-ING CAPABILITIES TO STRIKE TARGETS ON OTHER SIDE. HE CONCLUDED SIDES AGREE ON NEED FOR QUANTITATIVE AND QUALI-TATIVE LIMITS. BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS IS AGREED MEASURES BASED ON EQUAL SECURITY. US PROPOSED " KEY FACTORS" MAY PERHAPS REFLECT CONCEPTS ON WHICH DEPLOYMENT PLANS ARE BASED BUT THIS IS NOT BASIS FOR RECOGNIZING THEM AT TALKS.

10. SEMENOV THEN SAID TASK OF PRESENT PHASE IS TO LIMIT
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OFFENSIVE ARMS. SIDES AGREED EARLY IN SALT THAT AIR DEFENSES NOT SUBJECT OF CONSIDERATION SINCE THEY ARE NOT INCLUDED AMONG OFFENSIVE ARMS AND DEFEND AGAINST ALL TYPES AIR ATTACK.

11. JOHNSON SAID HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND SEMENOV STATEMENT THAT US PROPOSALS ARE AIMED AT BUILDUP. US PROPOSALS SIMPLE STRAIGHTFORWARD APPROACH TO LIMITING CENTRAL SYSTEMS AND ARE EQUAL FOR BOTH SIDES. HE PROMISED TO COMMENT ON SEMENOV STATEMENT NEXT MEETING. JOHNSON

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